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From its very beginning, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) has generated debate about the costs 
of preserving endangered species versus the benefits received as a result of their protection. This 
debate was foreseen, if generally understated, in the original legislation, and has been overstated in 
subsequent attempts to overrule it. Unfortunately, these debates have frequently emphasized 
antithetical positions without a detailed examination of the costs of protecting endangered and 
threatened species within a larger governmental regulation framework. Also, unfortunately, 
discussion of economics in relation to endangered species has been polarized in both public 
discussions and in the literature. There are two schools of thought. One side says that the 
existence of any particular species is beyond value (Bishop 1982). The other says that the 
extinction of species is an ongoing process, and that if a particular species cannot adapt to changing 
conditions, particularly if it has no commercial value, then efforts to conserve the species should 
not come at extravagant cost (Sansonetti 1991). This line of reasoning postulates that species, and 
their associated habitats, that have commercial value will be protected by private industry. This 
fundamental question of the value of an endangered species colors debate over the role of 
economics in the ESA.
Primary focus in my discussion will be placed on the costs of endangered species protection. The 
Act, and its legislative history, will be discussed when it relates to economic analyses or balancing. 
Specifically, the costs that result from protecting endangered species will be differentiated 
according to where they are likely to occur. The emphases in this differentiation will emphasize 
overlapping legal protections for the species (which I will call “screening”), the spatial scale of an 
economic analysis, and economic efficiency versus equity considerations in ascribing benefits and 
costs. Discrimination among these various effects is crucial because it determines the distribution 
of economic effects, both those resulting from the ESA law itself as well as how these costs are 
distributed throughout society.
Economic Effects in the E.S.A. Two sections of the Endangered Species Act have the 
potential to cause economic effects, while another two sections incorporate economics as a 
balancing mechanism. Section 7 of the Act requires that Federal agencies consult with the 
Secretary to "insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or
1 Portions of this essay first appeared in Souder (1993).
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result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by 
the Secretary ... to be critical..." (16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)). Section 9 of the Act regulates the 
"taking", or harm, to individual endangered species or actions that may cause harm to their habitat. 
Take is defined as "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to 
attempt to engage in any such conduct" (16 U.S.C. §1532(19)). The provisions of Section 9 
affect all persons, irrespective of whether Federal actions are involved.
Congress made it clear that economic criteria are not to be considered in either the listing or the 
designation of proposed critical habitat (H.R. Rep. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 
1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2,820). Economic considerations may be used to 
balance the Act's provisions in only two places. The first place is when critical .habitat is 
designated under Section 4(16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)). The second occurs during Section 7 
consultations, including the deliberations of the Endangered Species Committee when exemptions 
to Section 7 (and Section 9) are requested (16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)).
When designating critical habitat under Section 4 of the Act for a threatened or endangered species, 
the Secretary may
"tak[e] into consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any 
particular area as critical habitat. The Secretary may exclude any area from critical habitat if he 
determines that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part 
of the critical habitat, unless he determines, based on the best scientific and commercial data 
available, that the failure to designate such area as critical habitat will result in the extinction of the 
species concerned" (16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2))
The economic and social analyses for critical habitat are required under Section 4 of the ESA (16 
U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)), however, the Fish and Wildlife Service has not specified through rule 
making relevant economic criteria to use in excluding areas from critical habitat (50 C.F.R. Ch. IV 
§424.19).
The second area where economics plays a role is in the implementation of Section 7 interagency 
consultations (16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)). When the Service issues a jeopardy or adverse modification 
of critical habitat biological opinion, it must provide the applicant with reasonable and prudent 
alternatives—if they exist—to the applicant’s proposal (50 C.F.R. §402.4(g)(8), (h)).
“Reasonable and prudent” alternatives are defined as “alternative actions ... that can be 
implemented in a manner consistent with the intended purpose of the action, that can be 
implemented consistent with the scope of the Federal agency’s legal authority and jurisdiction, that 
is [sic] economically and technologically feasible” (50 C.F.R. §402.02). The criteria to determine 
what is economically feasible is left to the Secretary's discretion (50 C.F.R. Ch. IV §402.14(h)).
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Economics also plays a critical role in the ESA exemption process(16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(1)).
Should the Service issue a jeopardy opinion or find that the action will adversely modify critical 
habitat, and if either there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives or the Service and the project 
proponent cannot agree on them, then an appeal to exempt the action from ESA protections may be 
made to the Endangered Species Committee (16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g)(1)). To grant an exemption, 
the Committee must conclude that: (1) the proposed action has no reasonable and prudent • 
alternatives; (2) that the benefits clearly outweigh alternative courses of action and that the project is 
in the “best public interest”; (3) that the action is of “national or regional significance”; and (4) that 
the applicant has made no irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources (16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(h)(1)(A); 50 C.F.R. §453.03(1)). Economics are clearly involved in the second and third 
criteria. “Benefits” identified in the second criterion are defined as “both tangible and intangible, 
including but not limited to economic, environmental and cultural benefits” (50 C.F.R. §450.01). 
What is of national or regional significance will be discussed infra.
Economics is incorporated less explicitly in developing recovery plans for the species (16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(f)(1). First, Congress prescribed a system that gives priority in preparation of recovery 
plans to species that have the potential to conflict with economic or development plans (16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(f)(1)(A) citing P.L. 100-478 §1003, 102 Stat 2306 (1986)). Recovery plans are also 
required to contain cost and time estimates (16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B). Additionally, for those 
plans considered “major Federal actions,” an environmental impact statement must be prepared 
under N.E.P.A. that identifies the economic and social costs of various alternative processes to 
facilitate species recovery (P.L. 91-190 § 120(C)).
Protection of biological resources under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) is frequently 
considered to be encumbered by the requirement that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) 
conduct economic analyses prior to critical habitat designation and implementation of certain 
recovery plans. The requirement for these analyses are both procedural and substantive; and in 
both cases their underlying purpose is to require the Service to take a hard look at the effects of its 
proposed actions by documenting that it has considered alternatives, that the benefits of the 
proposed actions outweigh their social and economic costs, and that its decisions are not "arbitrary 
and capricious" as defined under the Administrative Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A)).
While these analyses are frequently viewed as roadblocks to implementation of the ESA, they have 
the potential—if properly conducted and used by the Service—to build public support for 
endangered species protection.
Approaches for Economic Evaluations. Traditional economic analyses conducted under §4 
of the ESA have focused on single species. However, packages of species listings are increasingly
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being proposed because (1) either the proposed critical habitat overlaps or is adjacent from one 
species to the next, and/or (2) because threats to the species are similar. This was the case with the 
big river fishes in the Colorado River Basin (U.S.F.W.S. 1993). The major parameters defining 
the type of economic analysis are determined by how wide-ranging the species' proposed critical 
habitat is, and by the sorts of deleterious effects on the species whose economic effects require 
analysis. A typology of social and economic analyses, shown in Table 1, can be constructed based 
on these two criteria.
Table 1. Typology of social and economic analyses with species examples.
Potential Effects
Concentrated Diffuse
Species'Geographic Dispersed I. Desert tortoise II. Mexican spotted owl
Distribution  Discrete III. Socorro isopod IV. SW willow flycatcher
Potential deleterious effects on species can be roughly divided into two types: those that are 
concentrated and those that are diffuse. Examples of concentrated effects are water impoundments, 
urban developments such as highways and housing, and collecting of the species. Diffuse 
deleterious effects take into account things like the cumulative effects of timber harvest and 
grazing, stream and groundwater hydrological modifications, pesticides and herbicides, exotic 
species introductions, and climatic changes. Determining cause-and-effect relationships between 
the activity and its impacts, both biological and economic, on the species is more straightforward 
with concentrated effects than with diffuse effects. Consequently, the types of economic analyses 
required differ between these two types of effects.
The second key determinant for economic analyses is the extent of the target species' distribution. 
Basically two different possibilities exist: the species can be located in a discrete, single or 
multiple, site(s); or the species can be widely distributed. The geographic extent of the species' 
distribution sets the bounds for at least the first level of determining the region of economic effects 
from designation of critical habitat and recovery of the species. And, in many cases, the 
geographic distribution will determine the amount of effort required—and the complexity—of 
coordination with affected interests.
Answers to questions in four specific areas will be required to conduct the economic and social 
effect analyses required under the ESA for geographic regions (within a state), ecosystems (within 
a region), and site-specific localities proposed for designation of critical habitat for one or more 
species. These questions relate to (1) the types of economic effects encountered in protecting
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endangered species, (2) how to discriminate between those economic effects that occur solely as a 
result of the ESA versus those resulting from other legal protections, (3) the appropriate scale to 
use to analyze social and economic effects, and (4) the geographic bounds for effects 
determination.
Specific questions within each of these four areas that need to be answered are:
• Determination of Economic Costs and Benefits. Three types of economic effects typically 
result from endangered species protection. These can be broadly categorized into either 
economic efficiency (prevention of waste), or distributional equity (who wins, who loses). 
Generally the economic efficiency criterion prevails—at least in critical habitat designations— 
while distributional equity considerations are commonly overlooked until political pressures are 
applied.
• Screening of Effects. How detailed should the economic and social effects of other Federal 
and state laws that come into play with ESA listing be examined? Similarly, how should the 
effects of listing, compared to critical habitat, compared to recovery be delineated?
• Scale of Analyses. What is the appropriate level of effects to analyze? This would seem to 
ultimately flip between viewing the effects from a broader perspective versus identifying the 
effects that result from smaller, chronic problems of the type usually addressed through 
adverse modification of critical habitat.
• Geographic Boundaries. How do you determine the geographic boundaries for estimation of 
social and economic effects for assemblages of listed species? How do these boundaries 
correspond to ecosystem boundaries, and how do these correspond to the specific locations for 
proposed critical habitats?
Determination of Costs and Benefits. Three types of economic impacts are used to characterize 
economic efficiency and distributional effects in the designation of critical habitat. These are only 
descriptions of economic impacts — similar to what would be used in a NEPA analysis — and not 
the criteria used to exclude potential critical habitat areas. The economic effect are characterized as 
(1) national economic costs, termed "efficiency"; (2) regional, or distributive, economic impacts; 
and (3) other costs that are not national or regional (for the northern spotted owl, see 57 Fed. Reg. 
1796, 1812 (1992)). Efficiency effects are measured as the change in economic rents and 
consumer surpluses attributable to the designated areas (57 Fed. Reg. 1812 (1992), with and 
without critical habitat; and the change in capital asset values (Ibid.) and wages lost by displaced 
workers who remain unemployed or are re-employed at lower wages (Ibid.). Regional, or 
distributional, impacts are reductions in county revenue sharing from Federal timber sales (Ibid.), 
the social costs to individuals and communities caused by a slowdown in timber dependent 
economies (Ibid.), and changes in state and county property and severance tax revenue (Ibid.).
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Two other effects that the Service identified but chose not to include in their analysis are the 
increases in profits that producers (including the federal government) would receive from higher 
prices for timber, and the effects of a decrease in real estate values that would be expected as a 
result of high unemployment.
The costs associated with species and ecosystem protection are commonly balanced by public 
benefits. Economic theory identifies three types of benefits from endangered species protection: 
existence value, option value, and human-use values (Norton 1986). Traditionally, the 
determination of these values for any given species is beyond the scope of the economic analyses 
for critical habitat designation. Benefits are mentioned, but then largely not incorporated into the 
analysis of the benefits versus the costs of designating specific critical habitat areas (U.S.F.W.S. 
1987). Usually, the only economic benefits considered in typical analyses are those resulting from 
the prevention of wasteful government expenditures (Souder 1986a, 1986b).
Screening of Effects. The analysis scale is inextricably linked with the comparative protections 
offered by other laws in relations to those uniquely provided by the Endangered Species Act. 
Additionally, as previously mentioned, economic effects that result from listing generally differ 
from those that result from designation of critical habitat. The determination of the economic and 
social effects from designating critical habitat for a single species can be envisioned as a funnel 
containing a series of finer and finer screens that sieve out the effects that do not result from critical 
habitat. This series of effect filters is shown in Figure 1.
Species are protected by a broad range of Federal laws and rules of general applicability such as 
NEPA, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, and the National Forest and Federal Lands Planning 
and Management Acts (NFMA and FLPMA). Agency internal policies and plans (i.e., Forest 
Plans, Allotment Management Plans (AMP), etc.) provide the second screening of economic and 
social effects resulting from endangered species protection. For example, most forest plans and 
AMPs mandate protection of riparian areas, and since these areas are frequently critical to 
protection of the target ESA species, economic and social effects under the ESA are subsumed by 
the effects of the agencies policies and plans. Protection may also be afforded the target species 
through other species' ESA protections. This occurs when another listed species occurs in the 
same location as the target species, and this species' protective measures also protect the target 
species. For example, riparian and stream protection measures required to prevent a jeopardy 
opinion for the listed Apache trout may prevent jeopardy, and possibly adverse modification of 
critical habitat, for proposed Arizona willow (Souder 1994). If this is the case, there is no 
additional social or economic effect from listing or critical habitat for the Arizona willow in areas of
6
overlay as long as any effects on the Apache trout are sufficient to trigger a Section 7 jeopardy 
opinion (Ibid.). However, added costs may result if actions that would not jeopardize the trout 
adversely modify critical habitat for the willow, or if the two species’ ranges do not overlap. 
Similar situations exist where other species' critical habitat overlaps the target species'. The final, 
and typically primary, screen for social and economic effects is the relationship between 
protections offered the target species as a result of Section 7 prohibitions on jeopardizing the 
continued existence of the species compared to the effects resulting from adverse modification of 
critical habitat.
Figure 1. Process for determining social and economic effects from critical habitat designation.
Social and Economic Activities in Region
Once social and economic effects are sieved through these screens, the effects remaining at the end 
represent those due to critical habitat designation. These procedures work well to determine the 
incremental effects of a single species in a single area, and thus provide invaluable information for 
the exclusion report. However, they work less well in determining the cumulative effects of all 
listings in a region. The regional cumulative effects analysis will start out at the third screen (in 
Figure 1) after economic effects are filtered through the first two screens—other Federal laws and 
agency policies and plans. From this level, detailed analyses of both the cumulative and marginal 
effects of individual species' protection and recovery measures can then be determined.
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Scale of Analyses. The scale question can be answered by applying the idea of tiering analyses, 
such as those used in the NEPA process. The framework would look something like this:
• At the regional level, employment statistics, demographic projections, and economic multipliers 
provide the bases for the analyses. Basic economic revenue flows would be traced to 
determine regional effects.
• The county level would provide the basic first level for impact assessments. This scale 
overcomes a common problem with existing, single-species, analyses where detailed economic 
effects are "washed out" by focusing on too large an area, for example a single or multiple 
states (for example, see the Colorado River big fishes analysis (U.S.F.W.S. 1993)).
• Localized impacts for specific species or assemblages of species at the sub-county level where 
appropriate.
• Critical habitat area site-specific economic and social analyses required for the exclusion report. 
This level of analysis focuses on each individual critical habitat area to weigh the benefits of 
designation compared to their costs.
However, under the regional- or ecosystem-based analysis approach, there is the potential to 
incorporate a higher degree of economic and social benefits in the analyses. Generally, the benefits 
of protection are considered to occur first as nationwide (or international under treaty), then multi­
state region, then state, then sub-state region, down to local areas. Once benefits are identified, 
procedures are required to trade off between these benefits and the level at which economic and 
social effects occur so that the net result can be displayed in the Exclusion Report. But since 
benefits tend to flow up from the local area to the nation, while costs of protection tend to flow 
down from the nation to the local area, there are issues of national versus local equity that need to 
be considered. We need a process to both identify these benefits and costs, as well as determine 
their significance, which is not done very well at present (U.S.F.W.S. 1992a).
Geographic Boundaries. The definition of region determines the context for incremental and 
cumulative analyses of endangered species protection costs. The differentiation between national 
and regional significance is used both in the economic analysis for determination of critical habitat, 
as well as by the Endangered Species Committee in determining whether an exemption to Section 7 
is justified (U.S.F.W.S. 1992). Significance in determining whether the benefits resulting from 
critical habitat designation override the social and economic costs associated with this protection 
turn on whether they are of regional or national significance. The definition of "region" was 
extremely important and controversial in the Committee’s hearing on the Bureau of Land 
Management’s request for an exemption for its timber sales in Oregon.
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However, region is nowhere defined in the Act or consistently in the legislative history. There is 
no regulatory definition of "region" (50 CFR §450.01). There is also no hard and fast definition 
of "region" for the purposes of analysis and exemption by the Endangered Species Committee 
(Comm, on Env. & Pub. Works 1982). Variously, region as been defined in terms of (1) multi­
state effects; (2) single-state effects; (3) multi-county effects; and (4) county effects. The question 
of whether a regional impact can result from effects in a single county (or even a single timber sale) 
were compared to whether effects had to be "regional" in a multi-state context in debates during the 
1978 ESA Amendments (H.R. Rep. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1978); H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1978)). Yet the issue of region, similarly to the issue 
of the scale, ultimately determines not only what types of costs and benefits are included in the 
economic analysis, but also their relative significance both to the “region” as well as to local 
affected interests.
Critical Economic Issues. Three issues affect the Service’s ability to effectively incorporate 
economic analyses in the ESA's implementation. They are directly related, and complimentary to, 
the screens used filter economic effects in the critical habitat analyses. First, to start estimating 
economic effects a determination of baseline conditions is needed. At issue is what can be 
reasonably certain to occur in the future, with and without consideration of the endangered species. 
Second, how any one specific potential action is compared to the cumulative effects of many 
previously existing or potential actions must be determined. Third, distinguishing the economic 
effects of listing compared to critical habitat designation effects is difficult, but required by statute 
and regulation. These three areas largely determine the which economic effects, and their 
magnitude that are affected by implementation of the Act.
Biological opinions issued by the Service in Section 7 consultations require a determination of the 
"effects of the action" (50 CFR §402.14(h)(2) and 51 Fed. Reg. 19932 (June 3, 1986)). A similar 
"reasonably certain to occur" criteria is used in the economic analysis to estimate the direct and 
indirect impacts resulting from critical habitat (U.S.F.W.S. n.d.). When the Service proposed 
regulations after the 1982 ESA Amendments there was extensive discussion of what "reasonably 
certain to occur" means (51 Fed. Reg. 19,932 (1986)). The resulting definition is that "reasonably 
certain to occur" means those "actions that are likely to occur, bearing in mind the economic, 
administrative, or legal hurdles which remain to be cleared" (51 Fed. Reg. 19,933 (1986)).
The "reasonably certain to occur" criteria is crucial to resolving the second critical issue: the 
determination of the cumulative effects of the proposed action. This is because the criteria at least 
partially delineates activities that are required to be analyzed in determining the "cumulative effects" 
of a specific Section 7 consultation in relation to other activities that may affect the species or its
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critical habitat (50 CFR §402.02, §402.14(h)). The limitation on how far to go in determining 
"cumulative impacts" is defined by regulation; consider non-Federal projects or activities that are 
unrelated to the one under consultation (51 Fed. Reg. 19,932-33 (1986)).
Standards for distinguishing between "jeopardy" and "destruction or adverse modification of 
critical habitat" are important because they divide the apportionment of impacts in the economic 
analyses for critical habitat determinations. The Service, in a since-withdrawn National Policy 
Issuance, described the differentiation as "one of the scope of analysis." Adverse modification of 
critical habitat is determined by an activity's effects on the constituent elements identified as 
essential for the conservation of the species that are listed in the critical habitat rule (U.S.F.W.S. 
1992). In contrast, jeopardizing the continued existence of a species requires a comparatively 
greater degree of effect, except when critical habitat occupies the entire range of the species and all 
constituent elements are.identified (U.S.F.W.S. 1992).
Conclusions. While some critics may lambaste the whittling away of economic effects 
suggested by my analysis, I believe that it is important to clearly identify economic and social 
effects specific to the ESA from those which could occur in the absence of its protections. This is 
the only meaningful way to evaluate alternatives to the existing Act. The glaring light that focuses 
on the ESA typically results from the Act’s clear standards—as delineated in an almost twenty year 
string of Supreme Court cases running from Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill (437 U.S. 153 
(1978)) to the recently decided Babbitt v. Sweet Home (No. 94-859-Opinion (1995))—in 
combination with the easy access that the public has to courts to enforce its provisions (16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g)). Because of the conjunction of these two features, the ESA incurs more suits, and faces 
greater challenge, than would otherwise occur. But it is noteworthy that in the almost twenty years 
since the 1978 amendment that established exemptions to the ESA, the Endangered Species 
Committee has not once lawfully found sufficient economic or social grounds to override Section 7 
protections (the Committee’s 1994 decision exempting 13 sales was stayed and subsequently 
withdrawn as a result of ex parte communications between the Committee and White House staff, 
Portland Audubon Soc’y. v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1550 (1993)).
Notwithstanding the above, economic costs are incurred as a result of the Act. While the Federal 
governments costs for its own actions under Section 7 can be rationalized as the cost of doing 
business, economic effects suffered by private individuals and states under either Section 9, or 
through the Federal permitting process under Section 7, need to be taken into account. But the 
most reasonable way to do this is to first determine the true economic effects resulting from the 
Act. This is difficult, as I have shown, because not only do other laws protect endangered species, 
but protective measures afforded to other endangered species provide protection to the target
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species. Overlapping species’ protections exacerbates the difficulty in determining single-species 
economic effects, but along with this difficulty it also provides an opportunity to conduct 
cumulative and ecosystem-based analyses.
A broader array of conservation measures could expand our horizons beyond just focusing on 
economic effects. Especially needed are measures that work from an ecosystem framework, that 
attempt to prevent the listing of species by protecting them and their habitat (see for instance the 
Forest Service’s proposed revisions of the National Forest Management Act rules in 60 Fed. Reg. 
18885 (April 13, 1995)), and that encourage private individuals to incorporate protection of 
endangered species in their own private actions (Keystone Institute 1995). Together these 
measures are more likely to positively affect species—both currently listed as well as those at 
risk—than all the grenade lobbing from each side about the costs and benefits of the ESA. That 
said, economics can play a positive role in species protection by highlighting who pays and who 
benefits, by allowing the evaluation of alternative methods to reach the same point, and by 
educating society on the costs and benefits that biodiversity protection provides.
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